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((Go as far as you can see; when you get there, you'll be able to see farther." 
Thomas Carlyle 
L Introduction 
Intellectual Property concerns products of the human mind. In fact, it is beyond 
doubt that it is the foundation of many of the most dynamic world enterprises, due to the 
"historical transition from an industrial society founded on tangible assets to an infonnation 
society based on intangible assets. "1 
Certainly the discussion involving the arbitration of intellectual property (IP) 
disputes has become significant as the number of transactions involving IP increased 
dramatically. Frequently IP issues tend to arise in license agreements, joint venture 
agreements, business acquisition agreements, and employment contracts. 2 
Despite a decade of efforts, it appears that the IP world remains hesitant to choose 
arbitration for the following two reasons; ( 1) that" the IP sector ... [prefers] litigation to 
arbitration of its disputes" and (2) that uthe IP disputes ... [tend to be] fundamentally 
different from other disputes.'' As a result, the IP sector would not be "well-served by the 
institutions of arbitration.)) 3 
11tere have been many efforts made byiit.'>titutions like the World Intellectual Property 
Organization (WIPO) and the United Nation.._<; Commission on International 1i·adc Law 
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1 Bryan Niblett, Arbitrating the Creative, 50-JAN DtSP. RESOL. J. 64 (January 1995), WL 50-JAN DRJ 64. 
2 Marc Blessing, Arbitrabi/ity of Intellectual Property Disputes, 1 ARBITRATION INTERNATIONAL i 91, 197-198 
(1996). 
3 David D. Caron, The World of Intellectual Property and the Decision to Arbitrate. 19 ARBITRATION 
INTERNATIONAL 441, 441 {2003). 
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(UNCITRAL) to increase the appeal of arbitration to resolve IP connoversics. For example, the 
creation of special arbin·ation rules4-where interim mea~ures, confidentiality and expertise are so 
irnportant~, the foregoing debate over the arbitrabilityoflP disputes, and the education through 
workshops and seminars.5 
The overall hesitancy related to the arbitration ofiP disputes could be linked to the "£1mily 
jewels" view, which is the idea that the IP rights are d1e asset of the company; so that arbitration is not 
sufficiently aggressive and "litigation allows greater 'flexibility' in design of one's strateg/' Also, there 
is the ''venLlJre capitalists-stock market" view, where "the attack on the 'family jewels' may not only 
take the jewels, but, in_ addition, the perception that the jewels could be taken may cause a loss of 
investor confidence." Still, there are other ex:pLm.ations to that hesitancy, as the uZeitgeL<Jt of the high 
technology world )J) or even the "legal culture view. '0 
One could also add other countcrvoilling considerations. First, there are IP specialized coutts 
in some countries, which offer greater predictability of decisions result than in arbitration and 
generatin_gsnunger deterrent effects through publicity. 7 Second, arbitration is often viewed as too 
costly, md there are not arbinators with as much expettise as other legal practitioners in the IP fie!d.8 
111ird, it could be more strategic for a licensor- that has been licensed in several countries- to bring 
lawsuits in the markets of it~ choice, discouraging inftingement in other m.arkets by means of 
publicity. And finally, litigation could be the best choice, due to questions related to the arbitTability 
ofiP matters, to the non~enforceability of arbin·al awards against third parties, and to the availability 
of effective interim relief, which is vital do IP disputes. 9 
In conLTa."it, Professor William Pmk arf,'LlCS that "the special nature ofiP arbitration is not 
really all thatspcciaL" 10 I tis true thatiP arbination raises public policy concems, but that is also the 
case of anLin·ust, securities regulation, and bankruptcy, TI1c reluctance of endorsing arbitration by 
citing the need fi:)r litigation flexibility and me tits appeal carries certain irony. After all, flexibility is 
the raison d'ttre of arbitration, and the absence of appeal can be one of the .srt·cat advantages of 
arbittation. 11 
In order to better understand the hesitancy toward arbin·ation in a pmticular jUiisdiction, it 
is helpful toexarnine other counnies' perspectives. So, the present author opted for this method of 
analysis, where the Ametican paradigm of arbin·ating IP claims is useful to explain the issues that 
Brazilian mbiW:ttors face. 
" See WI PO Arbitration Rules, available at http://www.wipo.int/freepublications/en/arbitration/446/ 
wipo_pub_446.pdf, and UNCITRAL Working Group on Arbitration on the topic of interim measures, available 
at http://www.uncitral.org/english/workinggroups!wg_arb/index.htm 
5 Caron, supra note 4, pp. 441-443. 
6 /d. note 4, pp. 445-448. 
7 Jochen Pagenberg, The Arbitrability of Intellectual Property Disputes in Germany, in WORLDWIDE FoRuM 0'-1 THE 
ARBITRATiON OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY DISPUTES March 3- 4, 1994, Geneva, Switzerland, available at http:/{ 
arbiter. wipo. int/events/conferences/1 994/pagenberg. html 
6 ld. 
9 Robert H. Smit, General Commentary on the WIPO Arbitration Rules, Recommended Clauses, General 
Provisions and the WIPO Expedited Arbitration Rules, 9 AM. REV. INT'L ARB. 3 (1998), WL 9 AMRIARB 3, 6-8. 
w William W. Park, Irony in Intellectual Property Arbitration, 19 ARBITRATION INTERNATIONAL 451, 451 (2003). 
11 fd. note 11, pp. 452-453. 
Intellectual Property Mandatory Rules und.A.rbitrability in the U.S and in Brazil 353 
~Tilis mticle first exmnines a val d' oLwu the concept of rnandato1y rules of private inten1ational 
law in the state courts, and then in international arbitration. SpeciilcaHy, the author addresses the 
effect of mandatory rules on the arbitrability ofiP disputes. Further, this article summarizes the 
historical fi:amework and the favor arbitrandum developments regarding the mbitrability ofiP issues 
in the U.S. and BraziL 
II. Mandatory Rules 
II. 1. Mandatmy Rules in the Courts 
Savigny has not ign.ored the notion of llktndatmy rules. 'Ibis great scholm· of the conflicts of 
law methods described mandatmy rules as "rules of a mandatory character, mandated by general 
interests". In the early 1940's two Germm1 scholars, Wengler m1d Zweigert, proposed the application 
of domestic and foreign. mandatory rules on the basis of territoriality, hTespective of the lex cau.~ae. 12 
Specifically, the discussion involving mandatory rules in private intemationallaw 14-ts been 
first addressed by Professor Francescakis in the late 1950's. Even before him, Professor Franz Kahn 
had already made a distinction betweenAusdelmungsnormen and Anwendungsnonnen. Professor 
Nt.L'isbaum distinguished choice a flaw rules fi·om spacially conditioned intemalmles. 13 
Definitively, the concept of mandatory rules differs from the notion of the classic 
conflict of law rules of private international law. Traditionally) the European bilateral 
conflict of law rules operate by connecting legal relationships. The applicable law is 
determined-the lex causae or in case of a contract the lex contractus- through the 
application of connecting factors (place of residence, domicile, main place of business) 
place of agreement, place of enforcement) etc.), 
12 Pierre Mayer, Les lois de police ~ Prob/emes actuels de methodes en Droit International Prive, in 
TRAVAUX DU COMIT~ FRAN<";AIS DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL PRIV~ 105 (t:ditions du Centre National de Ia Recherche 
Scientifique, Anatole 1988). "La notion de /of de police n'a pas ete ignoree par Savigny. Le grand 
theorfcien de Ia methode du conflit de lois n'a pas manque d'obsetver qu'elfe ne convenait pas aux 
'lois d'une nature positive regoureusement obligatoire, dictees par un motif d'interet genera!'; if ne 
se refr!Jrait toutefois qu'aux lois du for, et n'6nonqait pas a leur propOs une veritable methode 
concurrente de celfe du COnflif de lOiS." See alSO PH. FRANCESCAKIS, LA THEORIE DU RENVOI ET LES CONFUTS 
DE SYSTEMES EN DROIT INTERNATIONAL PRIVE 8 {Sirey, Paris 1958). "La regie de CO!lflif se dfstfngue deS rf:gles 
ordinaires du droit par cette particularit6 fonctionelle qu'e/fe ne d6digne pas directement /es 
consequences juridiques des faits dont efle prevoit Ia regtamentation mais qu'efle les d6signe 
indirectement, en se bornant a prescrire !'application a ces faits d'une /oi interne dE:terminee. Ainsi 
il n'est pas dans Ia fonction de Ia regie de conflit d'indiquer a que/ age une personne est capable 
de contracter. Elle d6signe seulement Ia loi, indigene ou Btrangere, a laque/le Ia reglementation de 
fa majorite sera empruntee en /'espece. Ef/e le fait en identifiant cette foi a travers un crit6re qu'el/e 
fournit elle-meme, fa nationalit6, te domicile de !'interesse, le lieu de passation de l'acte ... crit6re que 
/'on d6signe couramment en France par !'expression 'circonstance' au 6h!?ment, ou encore 'point' de 
rattachement." 
13 FRANCESCAKIS, SUpra note 13, p. 15. 
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Professor Francescakis explains that the bilateral conflict of law rule is quite 
abstract 1\ that is it does not take into account the fact that international contract 
relationships also have a macro/unction as instruments that regulate international economic 
and political behavior. 15 The overriding concern of the bilateral conflict of law rules 
relates to the legal relationship itself, or better, to the balancing of private interests, i.e. the 
microf~mction of an international contract. As a result, a conflict of law rule indicates the 
applicable law to govern the relationship at stake. 
On the other hand, the so~called ;',American Revolution" brought with it the focus 
on the purpose and intent of the rule; the center of consideration rests on the policy of 
substantive rules of the concerned states ('1special connection approach" or 
uSonderanknufJfungstheorie"). 16 This contrasts with the rigid method ofbilatcral conflict of 
law rules. Thereby, the mandatory rules method adopts a case~by~case approach, so that 
it is 11 the imperative nature per se of theses rules that make them applicablc." 17 The 
mandatory rules are therefore material rules of private international law as they directly 
govern legal relationship, rather than merely indicating the law applicable to it. 18 
In the European Union, the Rome Convention gives explicit mention to mandatory 
rules under its Article 7 (l) and (2). 19 Indeed, it has always been undisputed that a court 
must apply mandatory rules of the forum even though the parties submitted their contract 
to a foreign law. The legislative history of Article 7(2), which provides the application of 
the mandatory rules of the forum, reflects this attitude. 20 
Article 7 ( 1) refers to directly applicable rules of other jurisdictions, irrespective of 
the law applicable to the contract. It is important to note that "whether a rule is conflicts 
mandatory or not has to be deducted from the rule itself", as it defines its own applicability. 
Nevertheless, "the will of the legislature is not enough to sustain the application of conflicts 
mandatory rules of third countries.,. [because] in addition to the intent of having a rule 
14 !d. note 13, p. 107. "La /oi de police permet de tenir compte de Ia teneur concrete des rf:gles, 
alors que Ia r6gle de conflit, etant abstraite, ne /e peut pas. Un corol!aire de cette observation 
est que, tandis que /es o3g/es de conflit traitent de categories de rapports juridiques (au de 
questions de droit), tes lois de police voient leur competence pn:!:cisf:e de faqon ponctuelle. On 
remarquera que Ia definition proposee est mains celle des lois de police qu'une definition de Ia 
methode des lois de police, methode df:rogatoire a cel/e du conflit de lois." 
15 Natalie Voser, Current Development: Mandatory Rules as a Limitation on the Law Applicable in 
International Commercial Arbitration, 7 AM. REv. INT'L ARB. 319 (1996), LEXIS at 323. 
18 ld., at 324. 
17 Pierre Mayer, Mandatory Rules of Law in International Arbitration, 2 ARBITRATION INTERNATIONAL 
274, 275 (1986). 
1 ~ ANTONIO MARQUES DOS SANTOS, DIREITO INTERNACIONAL PRIVAOO 253 (ASSOCi8Qi'iO Acad8mica da 
Faculdade de Direito Lisboa, Lisboa 2000). "As normas de ap/icaqao imediata sao normas de 
direito material e nao sao regras de conflitos, como pretendem alguns autores conflitualistas au 
neo~conflitua!istas, que tendem a desvalorizar a radical especificidade que e/as representam 
para o DIP dos nossos dias." 
19 Convention on the Law Applicable to Contractual Obligations, Apr. 1, 1980, Official Journal C 
27 (Jan. 1, 1998) (entered into force on April 1, 1991). 
20 Stefan KrOll, Future perspectives of Conflicts Mandatory Rules in International Contracts, in 15 
PERSPECTIVES OF AIR LAW, SPACE LAW AND INTERNATiONAL BUSINESS LAW FOR THE NEXT CENTURY 89 (Car! 
Heymans Verlag, KOin 1996). 
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applied, a close connection between the contract and the country where the rule comes 
from is rcquircd."21 
An important precedent for Article 7 (1) Rome Convention was a Dutch decision 
in the Alnati case.TI1is has widened the scope of applicability of conflicts mandatory rules 
of jurisdictions beyond the forum state with which the situation is closely connected. 22 
Yet, Member States' courts appear reluctant to consider directly applicable rules of other 
jurisdictions.V At level of the European Community (EC), Professor Radicati di Brozolo 
analyzes the European Court of Justice leading case Eco Swiss China Time Ltd. v. 
Bcnetton24, affirming that arbitrators are to give due consideration to EC anti~ trust law. 25 
Another example of mandatory rules recognized by the legislature can be verified 
in Article 19(1) and (2) of the Private International Law ofSwitzerland. 26 In accordance 
with the practice developed under this provision, four conditions are prerequisite for its 
application: 
(i) Clear evidence that the foreign legal provision is intended to be applied to the 
case mandatorily (so~called 'h.nwendungswille"). 
(ii) A close connection between the case and the foreign legal provision (so~called 
~'Zusammenh.ang''). 
(iii) A preponderant interest of one of the parties that the foreign mandatory 
provision be taken into account ("schUtzenwerte und offensichtlich Uberwiegende Interessen 
einer Partei''). 
(iv) The relevant interests of the party deserve protection pursuant to the Swiss 
conception of law ("Normzwecl<. und Ergebniskontrolle"). 27 
Thus," li]nternational contracts cannot be isolated within a conceptual vacuum. 
Though it may be convenient to apply a single law to their main part, the fact that such 
contracts have effects in other countries which may be vitally important for the parties or 
those countries themselves cannot be ignored in the name of sanctity of the applicable 
law." 28 In short, Stefan KrOll explains that: 
TI1e justification for the application of conflicts mandatory rules notwithstanding 
the lex causae stems from the double function of international contracts. Primarily they arc 
the means by which the parties try to further their interest. ... However, contracts also 
21 /d., p. 96. "What constitutes such a close connection depends on the field of law the rule 
belongs to criteria often mentioned are the domicile of a party, the place of performance, and the 
effects in the country." 
22 HR 13 May 1966, NJ 1967. 
2 ~ H. L. E. Verhagen, The Tension Between Party Autonomy and European Union Law: Some 
Observations on lngmar Gb. Ltd. v. Eaton Leonard Technologies Inc., ICLQ 51.1 (135) (January 
2002), LEX IS at I (noting that Germany and the U.K. have opted out of article 7(1 ), but this does 
not mean that these courts cannot give effect to foreign mandatory rules). 
24 Case 126/97, Swiss China Time Ltd. v. Benetton International CV, 1999 E.C.R 1-3055 (1999). 
25 Luca G. Radicati di Brozolo, Arbitrato, diritto della concorrenza, diritto comunitario e regale di 
procedura naziona/i, 9 REVISTA 0ELL'ARBITRATO 665, 666-669 (1 999). 
26 Switzerland Federal Law on Private International Law (December, 181h 1987), SR 279. 
27 Marc Blessing, Mandatory Rules of Law versus Party Autonomy in International Arbitration, 14 
JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 23, 28 NO. 4 (December 1997). 
28 KrOll, supra note 21, p. 94. 
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have a second function in so far as they influence the structure of an economy and 
regulate the markets ... Given the overwhelming state interests, it is clear that the law 
applicable in these areas cannot be determined by tbe normal conflict of laws rules for 
contracts, the main objective of which is to promote private interests. In these fields ofiaw, 
the decisive criterion for determining the applicable law is not the individual rightness of 
a contractual relation, but its economical rightness. 29 
Moreover, one could say that mand8tory rules "<ire justifiable if society wants to 
protect ( 1) parties within a contract, or (2) parties outside a contract. "30 That is, it may be 
appropriate for the state to adopt a mandatory rule when the parties are unable to protect 
thetnselvcs when entering a contract (parentalism theory), or when third parties cannot 
protect themselves from the contract (externalities theory), 31 The first case consists of 
situations where there is no equilibrium as to the bargaining power of the parties involved, 
e.g. consumer matters; the second case is appropriate where securities or competition 
matters are concerned. 
As can be noticed, mandatory rules are~by dcfinition~not subject to contractual 
variation, leaving nothing to contract outY. So) given due consideration to the origins of 
mandatory rules in state courts, the following subchapter will address the treatment of 
mandatory rules in arbitration. 
II. 2. MandatOJy Rules in Arbitration 
Nowadays one of the most difficult questions confronting arbitrators is that of the 
application of mandatory rules. This issue is prevalent in more than 50% of casesY Indeed, 
('the extent to which an international tribunal must have regard to the manclatmy rules of 
the taw governing the parties' relationship 1 the law of the forurn 1 any supranational order 
and the law at the potential places of enforcement has been said to be one of the most 
difficult issues in international arbitration. "34 
11-aditionally, arbitration doctrine and practice tended to refuse the application of 
rules that were not chosen by the parties. Nonetheless, it is clear that the states would only 
recognize this private justice) as long as it takes into account the general interests defended 
by the statc.35 
29 KrOll, supra note 21, p. 100. 
3° Christopher R. Drahozal, Enforcing Vacated International Arbitration Awards: an Economic 
Approach, 11 AM. REV. INT'L ARB. 451 (2000), LEXIS at 471 (citing ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, 
Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An Economic Theory of Default Rules, 99 YALE L. J. 87, 88 
(1989)). 
31 /d. 
32 Alan Scott Rau, Arbitrability and Judicial Review: A Brief Rejoinder, 13 WoRLD ARB. & MEDIATION 
REP, 71 (March 2002), WL 13 WAMREP 71, 75. 
33 Blessing, supra note 28, p. 24. 
34 Sheppard, supra note 40, p. 231. 
35 Mayer, supra note 13, p. 114. "Comment I'Etat pourrait-il accepter de reconnaltre une justice privee 
sans imposer en meme temps 8 ceux qui Ia rendent de tenir compte des interets generaux - en tout 
cas de ceux qu'il defend lui-meme?" 
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Nevertheless, Professor Pierre Mayer argues that considering the applicability of 
those rules in arbitration is delicate, since the arbitrators do not have a forum. 36 In fact, 
from the arbitrators' perspective, the rules can be seen as either part of the lex contractus or 
not.37 Professor Goldman goes even beyond that, stCtting that an arbitral tribunal could be 
viewed as having a universal fOrum. 38 
As far as the broad concept of public policy is concerned, Audley Sheppard explains 
that it embodies the following substantive categories of rules: 11 ( l) mandatory rules/lois de 
fJolice; (2) fundamental principles oflaw; (3) public order/good morals; ( 4) national interests/ 
foreign relations. "39 
Similarly, the notion of public policy or ordre J)ublic, according to Daniel liochstrasse1; 
includes both (l) foreign interventionist rules (Eingriffsnormen) and (2) mandatory rules 
oflaw. The first ones are provisions that interfere with private rights or relations for 
governmental or economic reasons. The second ones- mandatory rules- are imperative 
provisions that govern the intemational relationship, irrespective of the law that was supposed 
to govern it. These can include competition laws, currency control laws, environmental 
protection laws, measures of embargo, blockade or boycott, and laws designed to protect 
the weaker party in legal relationships. 
Marc Blessing has classified mandatory rules into different categories. First, as to 
their origin, he explains that the interfering rules might pertain: 
(i) to the proper law of the contract (lex causae); 
(ii) to the law governing at the place of arbitration (lexfori) 4D; 
(iii) to a legal order of a third country; 
(iv) to a supranational order, such as e.g. resolution of UN Security Council, EU 
competition laws, other norms pertaining to an international public policy; or 
36 Mayer, supra note 13, p. 113. "En un sens Ia position de l'arbitre est plus propice a /'application des 
lois de police que cel/e du juge. En effet, si aucune loi de police n'est pour lui celle du for, aucune 
n'est non plus etrangere." 
37 Pierre Mayer, L'interference deS lOiS de police, in SEMINAIRE DES 7 ET 8 AVRIL 1986 - l'ARBITRAGE 
COMMERCIAL INTERNATIONAL 46 (CCI lnstitut, Paris 1986). "L'arbifre n'y a pas pour lui de lois de pOlice du 
for au de lois de police etrangeres mais simplement des lois de police extf:rieures 8 Ia lex contractus. 
Toute demi-mesure est done exclue. La position de !'arbitre est aussi plus favorable a une pesee 
objective des interets qui s'attachent a !'application de Ia toi de police et de ceux qui s'attachent 8 
/'application de Ia lex contractus; toutes les lois sont sur un pied d'egatite." 
38 D8bats, supra note 13. "[C]omme vous t'avez dit tres exactement, !'arbitre n'a pas de for, mais je 
voudrais completer un peu votre formule en disant qu'il n'a pas de for national, mais qu'il a un for qui 
comme celui de romans de Balzac est l'univers. En d'autres termes, il a le for de !'ensemble de Ia 
col/ectivite internationals " 
39 Audley Sheppard, Interim !LA Report on Public Policy as a Bar to Enforcement of International 
Arbitral Awards, 19 ARBITRATION INTERNATIONAL 217, 228 (2003). See the Same author for further 
explanations on substantive and procedural categories of public policy. Fraud/corrupt arbitrator, 
breach of natural justice/due process, lack of impartiality, lack of reasons, manifest disregard of the 
law, manifest disregard of the facts, res judicata, annulment at the place of arbitration are examples 
of procedural categories of public policy. pp. 230-243. See also Resolution of the !LA on Public 
Policy as a Bar to Enforcement of International Arbitral Awards, 19 ARBITRATION INTERNATIONAL 2'13, 
213-215 (2003). 
40 Also called lex arbitri. 
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( v) to the legal order governing at the potentia[ place where enforcement of the 
award might have to be sought. 
Second, he classified the mandatory rules as to the policies and cultural values or 
social interests that aim to be protected: 
(i) some are aimed solely at protecting certain monct::uy interests of the State, such 
as exchange control. regulations or transfer restrictions; 
(ii) some are of a merely policing nature; 
(iii) others are aimed at safeguarding certain vital interests of a State and its 
people's welfare; and, in particular 
(iv) others arc aimed at protecting the free trade and the functioning of an effective 
market, such a.-; competition laws.''4 i 
In fact, it is at the discretion of the arbitral tribunal to decide whether or not 
applying rules other than of the lex contractus. So, the arbitral tribunal "may find that the 
choice~of~law clause included by the parties in an agreement did not exclude the operation 
of mandatory rules of other legal systems. ''42 Hence, the arbitrators could apply mandatory 
rules as if they were facts like '1force majeure'' or "immorality". In addition, Professor 
Emmanuel Gaitlard understands that the arbitrators would be under no duty to apply 
these rules. 43 
Professor Pierre Mayer argued that mandatory rules should be applied if <~the 
mandatory rule belongs to the lex contractus"; if"the parties have not expressly excluded 
its application"; and if "one of the parties has invoked it before the arbitrators. "44 But the 
fact is that there should be "no justification for assuming that the mandatory rules of the 
lex contractus have a special and paramount position and that therefore the interests of the 
state that provides the lex contractus have to be respected with less scrutiny than the 
interests of other." 45 
So, the author of this paper agrees with Christophe Seraglini when arguing that the 
applicability of mandatory rules derived from the lex contractus, from the place of arbitration 
and from third states, should be given the same consideration, as long as one can verify an 
effective link between the mandatory provisions and the controversy at stake. In other 
words, mandatory rules are to be applied if their applicability seems to be legitimate. 46 
41 Blessing, supra note 28, pp. 26-27. 
42 Hochstrasser, supra note 44, pp. 68~69. 
43 Daniel Hochstrasser, Choice of Law and "Foreign" Mandatory Rules in International Arbitration, 
11 JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 57,58-59 No.1 (March 1994). (quoting Emmanuel Gaillard, 
Sentence arbitrate, Droit applicable au fond du /itige, DROIT INTERNATIONAL PRIVE FRAN<;AIS (1991 )). 
For more on the debate over direct or indirect application of mandatory rules in arbitration see 
Hochtrasser, id., pp. 70-74. 
44 Mayer, supra note 18, p. 280. 
45 Voser, supra note 16, at 339~340. 
46 Christophe Seraglini further states that the legitimacy of the application of mandatory rules depends 
on the principles accepted by the international legal community of States. See CHRISTOPHE SERAGLINI, 
lOIS DE POLICE ET JUSTICE ARBlTRALE 352-353 (08\IOZ, Paris 200"\ ). 
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Hence, "just as freedom of contract ... finds its limits at certain mandatory rules, 
the freedom of choice of law, which is nothing more than a different expression of the 
freedom of contract on the international level, flnds its limit.s at the mandatory and applicable 
rules of the law affected by an international agreement. "47 And, apart from this argument 
for the application of mandatory rules, there would be also the argument for the efficiency 
of the arbitral system. After all, one of the main concerns of international arbitration is a 
recognizable and enforceable rendering of arbitral awards; that is, arbitrators should think of 
the future of the award. 
So, it is important to emphasize that the limits found in the mandatory rules applicable 
to certain international legal relationship may affect the arbitrability of this legal relationship. 
This is covered in the following chapter. 
Ill. Arbitrability and Intellectual Property Mandatory Rules 
Arbitrabilitymeam the capabilityofbeing subject to arbitration. TIUs concept establishes 
the diving line between where the exercise of contractual freedom ends and the public mission 
of adjudication begins. 
Public policy in relation to arbitrability, even if it may still be a defense against 
enforcement, concerns the very beginning and basis of arbitration, namely the arbitration 
agreement or arbitration clause. 48 And, u [ t]he question of whether international mandatory 
rules have an effect on arbitrability should be basically be treated similarly to the general 
question of whether mandatory rules have an influence on the choice of rhe applicable 
law."49 
Professor Pictcr Sanders explains that"! t] he domain of arbitration, i.e. the extent 
to which parties may submit disputes to arbitration, depends in the first place on the 
applicable arbitration law." In addition, the domain of arbitration also relics on the legislator 
and on the courts- depending on the way they interpret the applicable law. 5° 
National arbitration laws may adopt different formulas as to the domain of 
arbiLTation. For instance, they can determine that disputes in respect of which it is permitted 
to compromise, or which are at free disposition of the parties, etc., are arbitrable. But 
whatever general formula is used, an award rendered outside the domain of arbitration 
could be considered againsr the public policy of a given countryY 
In essence, since it is a matter of national public policy, arbitrability can differ from 
one country to another. 52 Indeed, national judges and arbitrators look at arbitrability issues 
4
.
1 Hochstrasser, supra note 44, p. 85. 
~ 8 Robert Briner, The Arbitrabi/ity of Intellectual Property Disputes with Particular Emphasis on the 
Situation in Switzerland, in WORLDWIDE FORUM ON THE ARBITRATION OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY DISPUTES March 
3 - 4, 1994, Geneva, Switzerland, available at http://arbiter.wipo.int/events/conferences/1994/briner.htmt 
49 Voser, supra note 16, at 332_ 
50 Pieter Sanders, Arbitration, in XVI INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF COMPARATIVE lAW 1, 63 Chapter 
12 (J.C.B. Mohr & Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1996). 
51 /d., at 64. 
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from different angles. Therefore the freedom of the parties to opt for arbitration as an 
alternative to litigation may have different nuances. 53 
To startt subjective and objective arbitrability should be distinguished. Subjective 
arbitrability (ratione [Jersonae) concerns whether a party, under the applicable law, may be 
permitted to agree on an arbitration clause. In contrast, objective arbitrability (ratione 
materiae) relates whether, under the applicable law, the parties may submit a certain 
dispute to arbitration. 54 So, this paper will address objective arbitrability only. That is, the 
effect of mandatory rules on the arbitrability ofiP disputes. 
Lack of arbitrability can be raised before the arbitral tribunal or before a national 
court even while the arbitral proceedings are pending. Still, the arbitral decision may be 
subject to judicial review, where a state court may take a ((second look" at the arbitrability 
of the dispute either in a motion to set aside the arbitral award, or in a challenge of the 
final award at the recognition and enforcement stage. 55 
Both the U.S. and Brazil are parties to the New York Convention on the Recognition 
and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (hereinafter ((New York Convention"). 56 As 
far as this convention is concerned, the issue of arbitrability can be raised at two different 
stages: first, on the level of the enforcement of the arbitration agreement; and second, on 
the level of the enforcement of the arbitral award. 57 In these circumstances, the mandatory 
rule oflaw governing the arbitrability plays an important role. 1l1erefOre, one must establish 
a criterion in order to determine it. 
52 For further comments on the effects of pub!ic policy on arbitrability see JEAN~BAPTISTE RACINE, 
l'ARBITRAGE COMMERCIALE INTERNATIONAL E'.T l'0RDRE PUBLIC 25 et seq. (librarie G8n8rale de Droit et de 
Jurisprudence, Paris 1999). 
53 Patrick M. Baron & Stefan liniger, A Second Look at Arbitrability- Approaches to Arbitration 
in the United States, Switzerland and Germany, 19 ARBiTRATION INTERNATIONAL 27, 27-28 (2003). 
54 Albert Jan van den Berg, New York Convention of 1958- Consolidated Commentary- Cases 
Reported in Volumes XXI/ (1997}- XXVI/ (2002), in XXVIII YEARBOOK COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 562, 
628-629 (2003). See also Vesselina Shaleva, The 'Public Policy' Exception to the Recognition 
and Enforcement of Arbitral Awards in the Theory and Jurisprudence of the Central and East 
European States and Russia, 19 ARBlTRATION INTERNATIONAL 67, 77-78 (2003). 
55 Baron, supra note 54, p. 27. See Shaleva, supra note 55, p. 78. "The question may be raised, 
as we//, in proceedings before national courts at the time of recognition and enforcement of the 
arbitral award. Pursuant to article V(2)(a) of the New York Convention, arbitrability constitutes a 
separate ground for the refusal of enforcement of foreign arbitral awards. According to some 
authors, this text may be considered superfluous because arbitrability is part of public policy and 
is thus included in article V(2)(b)." 
Also Inter-American Convention on International Commercial Arbitration, made in Panama, 
January 301", 1975, article 5(2)(b), ratified by 18 countries, including the U.S. and Brazil, available 
at http://www.oas.org/juridico/english/treaties/b-35.htm; and Inter-American Convention on 
Extraterritorial Validity of Foreign Judgments and Arbitral Awards, made in Montevideo, May a•n 
1979, article 2(h), ratified 10 countries, including Brazil, but not the U.S., available at http:!/ 
www .oas. org/jurid ico/english/treaties/b-41 _htm 
56 New York Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (1958) 
(entered into force on June 7'n, 1959), available at http://www.uncitral.org/english/texts/arbitration/ 
NY-conv.htm 
57 Homayoon Arfazadeh, Arbitrability under the New York Convention and Lex Fori Revisited, 17 
ARBITRATION INTERNATIONAL 73, 73 (2001 ). !n the same way, Han. Andrew Rogers QC, Arbitrabflity, 10 
ARBITRATION INTERNATIONAL 263, 263 (1994}. 
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At the stage of enforcement of the arbitration agreement (Article II(3) New 
York Convention) 1 the law applicable to objective arbitrability is subject to considerable 
debate in the literature. Accordingly~ Professor Albert van den Berg lists a wide range of 
solutions: (1) the law of the forum; (2) the law applicable to the arbitration agreement; 
(3) the law of the place of arbitration; ( 4) the law applicable to the merits; (5) the law of 
the country where enforcement of the award is sought; (6) the substantive rule of 
inten1ational h1w; and (7) a cumulative applicability of the foregoing. The vast majority of 
courts tend to apply the lex fori to determine objective arbitrability of disputes. 58 
At the stage of enforcement of the arbitral award (Article V(2) New York 
Convention), the state court may take into account its own law when determining the 
domain of arbitration. 59 
Notwithstanding the position described above by Professor Albert van den Berg1 
Homayoon Arfazadeh argues that the arbitrability issues should not be treated as a problem 
of conflict of laws1 but rather of conflict of jurisdiction. Accordingly1 he suggests the 
application of the lex fori to arbitrability matters since these issues derive from the compulsory 
jurisdiction of national courts JJrompted by jJublic [Jolicy. 60 
In contrast to the position of the two authors above mentioned~ Marc Blessing 
concluded that "the issue of arbitrability should not be impaired by taking into account or 
applying any foreign mandatory rules of law; should not be impaired by the arbitrator 1s 
concerns as to the enforceability of his award; but should be denied only if indeed the 
affirmation of arbitrability be regarded as a fundamental violation of public policy (as 
applicable in international affairs). \\61 
The au thor of the present paper believes that the position argued by Homayoon 
Arfazadeh regarding the application of the lex fori both to the challenge of an arbitral 
agreement and to the recognition and enforcement of an arbitral award might lead to 
certain rrlex forism", that is 1 an excessive application of the lex fori. Forum shopping must be 
minimized, even if it is true that its abolishment in toto is impracticable considering the 
plurality of jurisdictions and the multitude of interpretations that may arise out of a single 
provision of uniform L:nv, e.g. European Union Conventions. So, the above interpretation of 
Articles II (3) and V(2) New York Convention by Professor Arrhor van den Berg seems to be 
more appropriate. 
Like all other property rights 1 IP rights are secured by the state. Hence~ ~'a patent is 
secured by a patent grant, a trademark or service marks, by registration, and copyrights and 
trade secrets by operation oflaw1 either statute or common law. 1!62 
58 Van den Berg, supra note 55, p. 630. 
ss fd., p. 666. 
60 Arfazadeh, note 58, pp. 74-76. 
61 Blessing, supra note 28, p. 31. 
62 George W. Coombe Jr., The Resolution of tntel/ectua/ Properly Disputes involving East Asian Parties, 19 
HASTtNGS INT'L & CaMP. L. REv. 707 (Summer 1996), WL 19 HSTICLR 707, 716. 
63 William Grantham, The Arbitrability of lntemationallntelfectuaf Property Disputes, 14 BERKELEY J. INT'L. 173 
(1996), WL 14 BERKJIL 173, 220. 
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In so doing, some countries disfavor the arbitrability of IP rights 'ibccause the 
exclusionary property rights contained in registrations can be enforced against anyone." 
Inasmuch as an exclusionary property right confers rights on the holder against the rest of 
the world, the IP rights contain a per se implication of a virtually infinite number of parties. 63 
Nonetheless, many countries permit the arbitration ofiP rights, considering IP disputes 
capable of settlerncnt and therefore arbitrable.64 
It is essential to clarify thm there are two distinct sources ofiP rights under the law. 
Hrst, IP rights can be created by the act of a sovereign state, and usually these rights are 
recorded in a state register and limited to a time period, e.g. patent rights, certain copyrights, 
trade names, trade logos, insignias, and certain trademarks. So, it may be argued that the 
court.·.; of a particular State would have exclusive jurisdiction to adjudicate issues related to 
these rights.65 
Second, there are IP rights that are created solely by the 8Cts of the eventual holder 
of the right, e.g. trade secrets, certain copyrights, and common law trademarks. With these 
rights, there are much less plausible arguments that would go against their arbitrability.66 
Marc Blessing suggests a similar distinction based on whether the IP rights exist 
independently of registration. In general, the IP rights that do not depend on registration arc 
copyright, trade secrets, and know~ how related rights. Moreover, in many countries, for 
instance Germany, U.K., and Italy, all kinds of distinctive si~:,rt1s, such as trade names, emblems, 
signs, slog;:ms, titles of books, rnagazines or newspapers, and the get~up of products can be 
protected as trademarks, even if they have not been registered by the owner. In addition, in 
the U.K. and in France unregistered design rights exist as well. 67 
Regardless of whether the IP rights ( 1) were or not created by the holder, and (2) 
were or not registered, the IP rights are created against all third parties. ln contrast, 
international commercial arbitration involves generally two parties to a contract so that in 
the arena ofiP law cerrain limitations can be put on the so~called party autonomy.68 
For instance, controversies related to trade secrets, know~ how, or confidential 
information are proper subject matter for arbitration in most countries. After all, being of 
private nature, these rights do not arise out of registration or examination. Yet, as far as 
injunctive relief is concerned, the public interest might be involved, and therefore it lTlay 
affect both arbitrabHity and enforceability. Then it is suggested that the parties be aware of 
the policies in the place of arbitration and in forums of possible enforcement of the awan._-1.69 
64 Sandra J. Franklin, Arbitrating Technology Cases, BQ..JUL MCH. B.J. 30 (July 2001), WL 80-JUL MIBJ 30, 32. 
65 M. Scott Donahey, Enforcement of Injunctive Relief and Arbitration Awards Concermilg Title and Enforcement 
of lnte!fectual Properly Rights in Asia and the Pacific Rim, 19 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REv. 727 (Summer 1996), 
WL 19 HSTICLR 727, 728. 
66 /d. (noting that when creating an industrial or commercial secret and its subsequent defense, such as 
preservation of its confidentiality and the protection against its inadvertent disclosure the trade secret 
holder creates its own right; and that when the copyright holder notifies the public on each publication 
of the materia! that the material is copyrighted, he/she creates its right as well). 
67 Blessing, supra note 3, p. 201-202. 
68 Donahey, supra note 66, at 729. 
69 David W. Plant, Myths and Misunderstanding Re Two Significant Aspects of ADR, SB41 AU~ABA 287 
{Dec. 12, 1996), WL SB41 AU-ABA 287, 296-297. 
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As for licensing or other contTact rights, contractual disputes arc typically arbitrable, 
as long as decision does not affect third parties, But a dispute as to the validity of a licensed 
patent may not be arbitrable in many countries. Here, injuctive relief may also affect 
arbitrability and enforceability. 70 
It has been argued that the arbitrability of IP matters depends on the nature of the 
claim at stake. Matters related to ownership of intellectual property rights arc far more 
controversial in tenus of arbitrability, as they fall within the public interest because they relate 
to a grant or to a registration with a public authority. 71 
Infringement disputes raise polemic issues as weU.n The same happens with cases 
regarding the validity and enforceability of patents and trademarks, as the majority of 
countries do not pem1it arbitration over these issues. 73 Professor Pieter Sanders argues that the 
70 !d., at 297. 
71 /d., at 297-298. (mentioning that "[c]ountries which appear to enforce arbitral awards regarding the 
ownership of registered intellectual property rights include Australia, Beigium, Canada, Czechoslovakia, 
China, Denmark, England, Germany, Italy, Mexico, Switzerland and the United States.The arbitrability of 
such rights appears to be improper, or at lest in doubt, in Finland, France, Hungary, Ireland, Israel, Japan, 
Korea, the Netherlands, Spain and Sweden."}. 
72 See Pagenberg, supra note 8 {stating that in Germany "[p]atent rights as such are assignable and can 
therefore be the subject of arbitration, and they can also be licensed (§ 15, Patent Act}. It also goes without 
saying that a patentee can renounce his patent (§ 20, Patent Act). It is, therefore, the prevailing opinion 
that there are no limitations to the arbilrability of patent infringement matters. Limitations exist however 
with respect to nullity proceedings.") See a/so Plant, supra note 70, at 298. (explaining that "Belgium, 
Canada, Switzerland and the United States permit the arbitration of disputes as to scope and infringement 
under most circumstances. Czechoslovakia, Denmark, England, Finland, Germany, Hong Kong, Ireland, 
Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Spain and Sweden favor arbitration of scope and infringement disputes 
provided that the arbitral award does not affect third parties or the public. The arbitrability of scope and 
infringement disputes is not permitted in Hungary, Israel and Mexico and is in doubt in Brazil, Australia, 
France and Korea.") Also Grantham, supra note 64, at 200-201 (commenting that in Argentina the 
copyright, trademark, patent and industrial model and design laws provide for penal sanction in the event 
of infringement, so that infringement issues relate to illegal acts, which are not arbitrable). 
n Pian!, id., at 299. (commenting that in '·[a] few countries, such as Belgium, Canada, Great Britain, 
Switzerland and the United States, appear to permit arbitration of validity questions regarding patents and 
trademarks.") For an overview on the arbitrability of patent valid'1ty, see also Paul M. Janicke, "Maybe we 
shouldn't arbitrate": Some Aspects of the Risk/Benefit Calculus of Agreeing to Binding Arbitration of 
Patent Disputes, 39 Hous. L. REv. 693 (2002), WL 39 HOULR 698~700. (explaining !hat "[r]he situation 
with respect to validity is more complex. Only a few countries-including Canada, Switzerland, and the 
United States~have explicitly embraced arbitrability of the question of patent validity of patents issued by 
them. Other countries, such as France and Italy, seem to follow a more restricted view, invoking the concept 
of ordre public to conclude that the question of validity is not arbitrable, but instead is subject to 
determination only by a public tribunaL In yet another group of countries the issue is subdivided. Private 
parties may arbitrate the validity question, but the result is binding only as between the parties and cannot 
bring about a general nullity as against oiher accused infringers. This situation appears to exist in 
Australia, Germany, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom. For Japan, some commentators indicate 
that an arbitral determination of 'invalidity will not have general effect absent an inval'1dation decision 
from the Patent Office, but the lack of such decision would not seem to preclude the availability of 
invalidity as an affirmative defense in an arbitration. Additional complications for arbitrability are posed 
by the laws of some countries. In Argentina, a criminally illegal activity cannot be arbitrated, and 
unfortunately, patent infringement is such an activity. In China, the authority to conduct an arbitration that 
has international characteristics is vested exclusively in the China International Economic and Trade 
Arbitration Commission (CIETAcrso it does not appear possible for the parties to determine by contract 
how such arbitrations will be conducted. Brazil apparently follows the ordre public concept mentioned 
earlier, so that the question of patent validity is regarded as inarbitrable. In Canada, despite the general 
approbation of arbitrability of patent disputes, the whole question remains unclear because the Canadian 
courts have not squarely addressed the arbitrability of patent cases.") Also, Briner, supra note 49. 
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non,arbitrability of the validity of patents or trademarks is quite expected, as 11a fortiori an 
arbitrator cannot f:,:rrant these rights."74 
Hence, "[wlhere intellectual properly affords themvncr the right to exclude the public 
from unauthorized use of the property, the intellectual property is manifestly imbued with the 
public interest" so that "there is troublesome uncertainty about the arbitrability of disputes 
where intellectual property rights are at issue-specially when different rights granted by 
different authorities are concerned."75 Now, this paper turns to the analysis of the question of 
arbitTability ofiP disputes in the U.S. and in BraziL 
III. 1. American Approach 
Historically, the U.S. courts tended to consider that extrajudicial resolution of disputes 
would oust their jurisdiction. 111is was based on the English Co nun on~ Law view that agreements 
to arbitTate were inherently revocable and therefore contrary to public policy.76 
Due to the expansion of world trade after the World War I and the treaties on 
arbitration in 1923 and 1927, the trading countries of the West increasingly enacted 
arbitration statutes. 77 The New York Arbitration Act of 1920 was the first modem arbitration 
statute in the U.S. that supported both institutional and ad hoc arbitration. 78 
Considering the flooding of the courts, and the lobbying efforts of several business 
organizations, including a proposal made by the American Bar Association, the Federal 
Arbitration Act (FAA) was enacted in 1925.79 It was "designed to reverse centuries of 
judicial hostility toward arbitration agreements and heralded the beginning of clear 
congressional support for a national policy honoring those agrecments."80 In 1926 the 
American Arbitration Association was formed, estabLishing an organized system of 
arbitrating commercial disputes. 81 Since then, the U.S. has expressed its commitment to 
74 Sanders, supra note 51, p. 66. 
75 Plant, supra note 70, at 296. See also Niblett, supra note 2, at 67. 
75 Michael R. Voorhess, International Commercial Arbitration and the Arbitrability of Antitrust Claims: 
Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Piymout!?. 14 N. KY. L. REv. 65 (1987). WL 14 NKYLR 65, 66; John 
J. Kerr, Jr., Arbitrabi!ity of Securities Law Claims in Common Law Nations. 12 ARBITRATION INTERNATIONAL 171, 
171 (1996). Nonetheless, Professor Derek Roebuck argues that it is quite controversial the assumption of 
judge's jealousy of arbitration influenced the earlier development of common law, because one cannot 
find enough evidences to support this assumption, see Derek Roebuck, The Myth of Judicial Jealousy, 10 
ARBlTRATION INTERNATIONAL 395, 406 (1994). 
77 /d., at 67 & 90 (noting that the Geneva Treaties of 1923 and 1927 were superseded by the New York 
Convention of 1958, which was adopted by the U.S. with the enactment of the Federal Arbitration Act 
of 1970) 
78 N.Y. Civ. Prac. Law 7501-7514 (Consol. 1981). 
79 Jeffrey W. Stempel, Pitfalls of Public Policy: the Case of Arbitration Agreements, 22 ST. MARY's L.J. 
259 {1990), WL 22 STMLJ 259, 277. For the Federal Abitration Act, see Pub. L. No. 68-401, 43 Stat. 
883 (1925) {current version at 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-14 (1982)). 
80 Jill A. Pietrowski, Enforcing International Commercial Arbitration Agreements%Post Mitsubishi Motors 
Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 36 AM. U. L. REv. 57 (Fall1986), WL 36 AMULR 57, 61-62. 
81 Stempel, supra note 80, at 275-276 
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international arbitration by becoming a party to several international treaties that govern 
arbitration, such as the New York Convention.8z 
These developments converged with the U.S. Supreme Court's elaboration of a 
federal doctrine on international connnerciallitigation and arbitration. 53 Accordingly, 
agreements to arbitrate and arbitral awards had to be enforced. Enforcement was crucial 
because predictability in international commerce and the furthering of U.S. economic 
interests were extremely necessary. 54 
In addition, the U.S. Congress has been active in passing legislation favoring 
arbitration. For example, in the early 1970s, several acts reflected the legislature's new 
determination to include arbitration explicitly in the statutory text, as in the Ti·ans~Alaska 
Pipeline Authorization Act of 1973115 , and in the Commodity Futures Trading Commission 
Act of 1974.86 Also, the same can be noticed under§ 513 of the Arnericans with Disabilities 
Act (ADA) 87 , and§ 118 of the Civil Rights Act of 1991 88 , which affects other statutes, 
such as the ADA, Title VII of the Civil Right Act of 1964, the Civil Rights Act of 1866 and 
the Age Discrimination of Employment Act of 1967.89 
82 Pietrowski, supra note 81, at 63. (the Federa! Arbitration Act of 1970 enacted the New York Convention 
in the U.S.} 
83 See Sherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 510 & n.4 (1974) (recognizing that passage of 
the Act was specifically designed to eliminate judicial hostility toward arbitration). As for the 
U.S. Supreme Court's role in promoting arbitration, see Diane P. wood, The Brave New World of 
Arbitration, 31 CAP. U. L. REV. 383 (2003), WL 31 CAPULR 383, 384-390 & 411 (citing: Hardware 
Dealers' Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Glidden Co., 284 U.S. 151 (1931}; Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & 
Conklin, Mfg., 388 U.S. 395 (1967}; Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1 (1985); and further 
cases that eliminated any doubt about the arbitrability of public Jaw, statutory claims: Mitsubishi 
case (antitrust claims were held arbitrable); Shearson/American Express Inc. v. McMahon, 482 
U.S. 220 (1987) (domestic Exchange Act cases under Rule 1 Ob-5 and RICO claims were held 
arbitrable); Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477 (1989) (securities 
claims were held arbitrable-Wilko was overruled)·, Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 
U.S. 20 (1991) (labor claims were held arbitrable, being subject to a case-by-case analysis); 
Allied-Bruce Terminix Companies, Inc. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 281 (1995) and Doctor's Associates, 
Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681, 688 (1996) (states were held not authorized to adopt specific 
statutes invalidating arbitration clauses); Circuit City Stores. Inc. v. Adams. 532 U.S, 105 (2001) 
(labor claims were held arbitrable, as the exception concerning the arbitration of "contracts of 
employment of seamen, railroad employees, or any other class of workers engaged in foreign or 
interstate commerce" of the Federal Arbitration Act was construed narrowly)). For further comments 
on the U.S. Supreme Court's role, see also Han., supra note 58, at 264-269; Joseph T. Mclaughlin, 
Arbitrabi/ify: Current Trends in the United States, 12 ARBITRATiON INTERNATIONAL 113, 114-116 (1996). 
84 /d., at 516-517 & 629. For further comments, see RUSSELL J. WEINTRAUB, INTERNATIONAL LITIGATION AND 
ARBITRATION 100-101 (41h ed. 2003) (stating that, under the influence of Mitsubishi, \ower courts have 'favored 
enforcement of international arbitration agreements even when public Jaw claims are made (Mitsubishi 
Motors v. Soter Ch!)lsler-Piymouth, 473 U.S. 614, 628-632 (1985))). 
85 Pub. L. No. 93-153, tit. 1!, 87 Stat. 576,584 (codified at 43 U.S.C. §§ 1651-1655 (1988 & Supp. IV 
1992)). For further comments, see Douglas E. Abrams, Arbftrabffity in Recent Federaf Civil Rights Legislation: 
the Need for Amendment, 26 CoNN. l. REv. 521 (Winter 1994), WL 26 CTLR 521, 533. 
00 Pub. L. No. 93-463, 88 Stat. 1389 (1974) (codified in scattered sections of 7 U.S.C.). For further 
comments, see Abrams, supra note 86, at 534. 
87 42 U.S.C. § 12212 (1995). 
88 Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071. 
a9 McLaughlin, supra note 84, p. 122-123. 
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As for IP arbitration, beginning in 1982 the U.S. Congress enacted a series of 
legislative acts providing for voluntary arbitration of patent disputes. First, there was the 35 
U.S. C.§ 294 of 1982.90 It is important to notice that its "legislative history shows that 
Congress wished to make it dear that, notwithstanding some of contrary court decisions, 
arbitration could be used to decide disputes concerning patent validity and infringement."91 
Second, the Patent Law Amendments Act of 1984 replaced subsection (a) of 35 
U.S. C.§ 135, which broadened what constitutes patent interferences under§ 135 (d) .92 
Finally, there was the enactment of the Semiconductor Chip Protection Act of 
1984, which "sanctions litigation of disputes over royalties payable for innocent infringement 
chip~product rights unless they are resolved by voluntary negotiation, binding arbitration, 
or mediation. "93 
so Pub. L. No. 97-247, 96 Stat. 317 (1982) (codified as amended at 35 U.S.C. § 294 (1988); effective on 
Feb. 27, 1983). Section 194 provides; 
(a) A contract involving a patent or any right under a patent may contain a provision requiring arbitration 
of any dispute relating to patent validity or infringement arising under the contract. In the absence of such 
a provision, the parties to an existing patent validity or infringement dispute may agree in writing to settle 
such dispute by arbitration. Any such provision or agreement shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, 
except for any grounds that exist at law or in equity for revocation of a contract. 
(b) Arbitration of such disputes, awards by arbitrators and confirmation of awards shall be governed by title 
9, United States Code, to the extent such title is not inconsistent with this section. In any such arbitration 
proceeding, the defenses provided for under section 282 of this title shall be considered by the arbitrator 
if raised by any party to the proceeding. 
(c) An award by an arbitrator shall be final and binding between the parties to the arbitration but shall have 
no force or effect on any other person. The parties to an arbitration may agree that in the event a patent 
which is the subject matter of an award is subsequently determined to be invalid or unenforceable in a 
judgment rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction from which no appeal can or has been taken, such 
award may be modified by any court of competent jurisdiction upon appiication by any party to the 
arbitration. Any such modification shall govern the rights and obligations between such parties from the 
date of such modification. 
(d) When an award is made by an arbitrator, the patentee, his assignee or licensee shall give notice thereof 
in writing to the Commissioner. There shall be separate notice prepared for each patent involved in such 
proceeding. Such notice shall set forth the names and addresses of the parties, the name of the inventor, 
and the name of the patent owner, shall designate the number of the patent, and shall contain a copy of 
the award. If an award is modified by a court, the party requesting such modification shall give notice of 
such modification to the Commissioner. The Commissioner shall, upon receipt of either notice, enter the 
same in the record of the prosecution of such patent. If the required notice is not filed with the Commissioner, 
any party to the proceeding may provide such notice to the Commissioner. 
(e) The award shall be unenforceable until the notice required by subsection 
(d) is received by the Commissioner. 
91 Robert B. von Mehren, New Areas for lntemational Commercial Arbitration, 477 PLI/COMM 159 (Oct. 6, 
1998), WL 477 PLI/Comm 159, 169. 
02 Patent interferences are disputes created by two or more applications claiming a patent on the same 
subject matter. See Karl P. Ki!b, Arbitration of Patent Disputes: an Important Option in the Age of 
Information Technology, 4 FORDHAM !NTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. l.J. 599 (Autumn 1993), WL 4 FDMIPMELJ 
599,605. See 35 U.S.C. § 135(d) (1988) (as amended by the Patent Law Amendments Act of 1984, Pub. 
L. No. 98-622, §§ 105, 203, 98 Stat. 3385, 3386 (1984)). 
93 Kilb, supra note 93, at 606. See Publ. L. No. 98-620, tit. Ill,§ 302, 98 Stat. 3347-55 (1984) (codified as 
amended at 17 U.S.C. §§ 901-914 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992)). For further comments, see Abrams, supra 
note 86, at 535. 
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At this point, the author commences the analysis on arbitrability regarding specific 
areas of patent rights, copyrights, trademarks, and trade secrets. 
a. Patents 
Soon after the enactment ofFJV\ of1925, the patent exception to arbitrability was 
first recognized in 1.930 in Zip Manufacturing Co. v. Pep ManufacturingCoY4 Nonetheless, 
in 1982 the U.S. Congress made some amendments to the patent laws, but still took no 
position on whether the Zip line of cases had correctly interpreted the FAA.95 In fact, the 
U.S. Congress legislatively overruled the patent version of the public policy exception. 
After all, the FAA was also considered to represent a "public policy" choice, as long as the 
arbitration system enhances the patent system and encourages innovation, that is to say 
that it would be less costly both to the parties and to the public.96 
The Court of AppeaLs for the Federal Circuit seems to favor arbitration. r:or instance, 
in In re Medical Engineering Corporation, the court of appeals upheld a district court 
order staying a patent infringement action in favor of arbitration. 97 Moreover, in Rhone, 
Poulenc Specialities Chimiques v. SCM Corp., the court of appeals broadly construed the 
scope of an arbitration clause, in order to include issues regarding infringement and the 
scope of the licensed patent claims.98 
As for rhe statutory change of 1982, arbitral awards are binding inter partes only, 
and the parties may agree that the arbitral award will be modified where a court later 
makes a final decision on the validity or enforceability of the patent. Besides that, the 
enforcement of the arbitral award depends on whether the patentee gives the required 
notice of the award to the Commissioner of Patents and 11-ademarks (CPT) .99 
Moreover, as far as the statutory change of 1984 is concerned, there has been some 
doubt as to the value of arbitration in the area of patent interferences, since the U.S. 
s4 Zip Manufacturing Co. v. Pep Manufacturing Co., 44 F.2d 184 (D. Del. 1930). See atso 
Beckman Instruments, Inc. v. Technical Develop. Corp., 433 F.2d 55, 63 (71h Cir. 1970) In the latter 
case it was held that due to the great public interest in challenging invalid patents, this issue was 
said to be nonarbitrable. in contrast, the ruling over disputes related to royalties pursuant to 
license agreements could be subject to binding arbitration. In this way, see David W. Plant, 
fnte//ectuaf Property: Arbitrating Disputes in the United Stales, 50-SEP D1sP. REsoL. J. 9 (Jul./ 
Sept. 1995), WL 50-SEP DRJ 9 & 16. Also, Rupak Nag, Copyright Disputes: The Case for 
Writing Voluntary Arbitration into the Copyright Act, 51-0CT D1sP. RESOL. J. 8 (October 1996), WL 
51~0CT DRJ 8, 10 & 16 (citing N.V. Maatschappij Voor lndustriele Waarden v. A.O. Smith Corp., 
532 F.2d 874, 876 (2~d Cir. 1976); Diematic Mfg. Corp. v. Packaging Indus., 381 F.Supp. 1057 
(S.D.N.Y. 1974), appeal dismissed, 516 F.2d 975 (2~c Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 913 (1975); 
Foster Wheeler Corp. v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 440 F.Supp. 897, 901 (S.D.N.Y. 1970)). Also 
Pietrovski, supra note 81, at 70 & 92 (citing Hanes Corp. v. Millard, 531 F.2d 585, 593 {D.C. Cir. 
1976) (determining that questions of patent validity were outside expertise and competence of 
arbitrators)). 
95 35 U.S.C. § 294 (effective February 27, 1983) 
% Michael A. Lindsay, 'Public' Rights and Private Forum: Pre-dispute Arbitration Agreements and 
Securities Litigation, 20 LoY. L.A. L. REv. 643 (April 1987), WL 20 LYLALR 643, 682-683. 
9
., In re Medical Engineering Corporation, 976 F.2d 746 (Fed. Cir, 1992). 
98 Rhone-Poulenc Specialities Chimiques v. SCM Corp., 769 F.2d 1569 (Fed. Cir. 1985). 
99 See supra note 91, and Grantham, supra note 64, at 215. 
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Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) is not considered bound to any patentability 
determinations. In Utter v. Hiraga, the language of the 35 U.S.C. § 135 (d) was understood 
not to preclude an arbitrator to make a patentability determination, although this is subject 
to the CPT's review. 1c-o 
The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, however, in Farrel Corp. v. U.S. 
lntemational Trade Commission, refused ''to pennit arbitration to supersede the jurisdiction 
of the U.S. International11:ade Com.mission (fTC) over IP issues arising in a 19 U.S.C. § 
13337 (a) proceeding." 101 The ITC complaint was on the grounds of misappropriation of 
trade secrets, trademark infringement, and false representations as to source. The Court 
of Appeals understood that there was a legal constraint that foreclosed arbitration, based 
on the Mitsubishi Motors v. Soler Cluysler-Piymouth holding that: 
[a] party to an international transaction will be required to honor its agreement to 
arbitrate disputes involving statutory claims under U.S. law when the arbitration agreement 
re<J.ches the statutory issues and when there are no legal constraints external to the 
agreement which foreclose arbitration of such claims. 102 
Indeed, the Court of Appeals found that the Mitsubishi rationale was confined to 
judicial proceedings and not applicable to administrative proceedings, as in those of the 
ITC. The court also mentioned the case Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., where 
an arbitration agreement was regarded as a waiver of access only to a judicial forum, but 
not to an administrative forum. 103 ln short, the Farrel decision concerns the impact of an 
arbitration agreement after an ITC investigation has commenced. 104 
b. Copyright 
Unlike a patent dispute, disputes concerning copyright usually do not involve a 
contractual relationship, which could entail an arbitration agreement. Hence, this may be 
considered a reason for the lower amount of cases involving the arbitrability of copyright 
issues, since the parties tend to litigate their disputes. 105 
Even though the U.S. Congress did not expressly authorize arbitration for copyright 
disputes in the Copyright Act of 1976 (Copyright Act) i06 or under Tide 37 of the Code of 
100 Utter v. Hi raga, 845 F.2d 993 (Fed. Cir. 1988). For further comments on that, see Richard H. Kreindler, 
Arbitration: A Creative Alternative to Intellectual Property Litigation in Light of Two Recent U.S. 
Supreme Court Decisions, 9 WORLD ARB. & MEDIATION REP. 13 (January 1998), Wl 9 WAMREP 13, 14-15. 
With this, the decision according to which the arbitrators do not have independent power to invalidate 
patents was not overlooked: Ballard Medical Products v. Wright, 823 F.2d 527, 531 (Fed. Cir. "\987). 
101 Farrel Corp. v. U.S. lnt'l Trade Commission, 949 F.2d 1147, 1150-51 (Fed. Cir. 1991 ). See Plant, supra 
note 95, at 9 & 16. 
1c2 Mitsubishi, supra note 85, at 628. 
w3 Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 111 S.Ct. 1647, 1653 (1991). 
104 Plant, supra note 95, at 10. 
105 Julia A. Martin, Note, Arbitrating in the Alps rather than Litigating in Los Angeles: The Advantages 
of International Intellectual Property-Specific Alternative Dispute Resolution, 49 STAN. L. REv. 917 (April 
1997), WL 49 STNLR 917, 939. 
'
00 17 U.S.C. §§ 1·810 (1988). 
Intellectual Properly Mandatory l.(ules andArbitral,ility in the U.S and in Brazil 369 
Federal Regulations 107 , copyright license agreements may provide for arbitration. In 
Kamakazi Music Corp. 'V. Robbins Music Corp., the Court of Appeals endorsed the 
arbitrability of copyright infringement claims where copyright matters other than validity 
were at stake. 108 In so doing, the court held that in ''the circumstances of ... [this] case, 
the arbitrator had jurisdiction to make an award under the Copyright Act," and that "the 
arbitration clause was broad enough to encompass Copyright Act claims which required 
interpretation of the contract". 109 Moreover, the court found that public policy grounds 
could not prevent the submission of copyright infringe1nent issues to arbitration, since 
what falls within the public policy scope is the limited monopoly created by a valid 
copyright. 110 As can be noticed from this decision, the validity of a copyright was not at 
issue. 
In contrast, there are examples where all copyright claims were held arbitrable, 
including validity. 111 In Saturday Evening Post Co. v. Rumbleseat Press, Inc., the Court of 
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit determined that '\m arbitrator may determine the validity 
of a copyright when the issue arises in a copyright license lawsuit. "112 Furthermore, the 
court stated that since antitrust issues involving an economic monopoly, and since patent 
validity issues could be subject to arbitration, there was no reason to prohibit arbitration of 
much less dangerous monopolies; that is, copyright monopolies are less dangerous than 
patent ones. 113 However, the court made clear that any arbitral decision concerning 
validity would only be binding on the parties and could not be established against all 
potential infringers. 114 
Besides this Seventh Circuit decision, the Forth and the Second Circuit made 
explicit the growing trend favoring arbitration. 115 StilC the arbitrability of copyrights is not 
quite settled. After all, one could argue that "an infringement or validity claim arising out 
of a copyright license dispute regarding, for instance, royalties, is probably arbitrable after 
Saturday Evening Post; yet, if the claim is based on federally registered copyright and 
relies directly on the Copyright Act, the claim is not arbitrable." 116 
"' 37 C.F.R. §§ 201.1-211.6 (1992). 
10B Kamakazi Music Corp. v. Robbins Music Corp., 684 F.2d 228 (2nd Cir. 1982). 
109 !d. at 230-231. 
11o See Kamakazi, at 231. 
111 American Concept v. lrsay, No. 84 C 10026 (N.D. !II. Oct 4, 1985). Lindsay, supra note 97, at 685 & 703. 
112 Plant, supra note 95, at 12. See Saturday Evening Post Co. v. Rumbleseat Press, Inc., 816 F.2d 1191, 
1198-99 (7" Cir. 1987). 
113 !d. See also Summer Rain v. Donning Company/Publishers, Inc., 964 F.2d 1455, 1460-61 (41M Cir. 
1992). 
114 Saturday Evening, supra note 113, at 1198. See Nag, supra note 95, at 12 (citing Lorber Industries of 
CA v. Los Angeles Printworks Corp., 803 F.2d 523 (91h Cir. 1986) (holding that the defendant could not be 
compelled to arbitration, as it was not a party to the copyright licensing agreement)). 
115 Summer Rain v. Donning Company/Publishers, Inc., 964 F.2d 1455, 1460-61 (41h Cir. 1992); See Martin 
supra note 106, at 940-941 & 970 (citing McMahan Sec. Co. v. Forum Capital Markets, 35 F.3d 82 (2n<i Cir. 
1994) (ruling that the presence of complex copyright issues did not preclude arbitration of the dispute); and 
Folkways Music Publishers, Inc. v. Weiss, 989 F.2d 108 (2nd Cir. 1993) (affirming arbitrators' resolution of an 
issue as to the ownership of copyrights)). 
116 Nag, supra note 95, at 16. 
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c. Trademarks 
The area of trademarks is not as developed as that of patent law, due the lack of 
contractual relationships between the parties. As a result, there is not sufficient incentive 
to pursue arbitration. Like copyrights, no federal or state authority has provisions regarding 
binding arbitration to trademark disputes. 117 
David Plant explains that '1ln contrast to patent rights and copyrights, rights in a 
trademark in the U.S. arise primarily under the common law as the result of appropriate 
use of the mark. Such rights may be augmented by registration pursuant to the Federal 
Trademark (Lanham) Act of 1946, or by registration to one or more state trademarks acts, 
or both." So, as for trademark matters, validity appears to be arbitrable where the issues 
arise out of a license agreement, rather than a federal trademark statute. 118 
But this was not what was decided in Wyatt Earp Enterprises v. Sackman, Inc., in 
which Wyatt Earp claimed trademark infringement after the expiration of the license 
agreement. In this case the court held that, because the claim was a tort cause of action 
rather than a contract dispute, it was not covered by the arbitration clause. 119 
Three years later the same court, in Saucy Susan Products, Inc. v. Allied Old 
English, Inc., decided ~hat disputes over tradernarks and trade names were arbitrable, 
considering decisions of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit favoring 
arbitration. 120 
In Homewood Industries, Inc. v. CaldwelL however, a district court in Illinois 
found that trademark infringement claims were not arbitrable, holding that the jurisdiction 
of the district court over a cause of action arising under the federal trademark (and 
patent) laws was exclusive pursuant to 28 US.C § 1338. But this party's <J.ssumption that 
the Congress' intent not to allow arbitration had grounds on the absence of a provision 
regarding arbitration in the 'TJ-ademark Law. 122 
Moreover, in U.S. Diversified Industrles, Inc. v. Barrier Coatings Corporation, a 
district court understood that the trademark infringement issue was within the scope of 
the broad arbitration agreement. 123 This decision reveals the need of care when drafting 
11 7 Martin, supra note 106, at 941. 
118 See Necchi Sewing Mach. Sales Corp. v. Necchi S.p.A., 369 F.2d 579 (2"d Cir. 1966) (holding that 
a claim for unauthorized use of trademark was arbitrable pursuant to the parties's arbitration agreement): 
Givenchy SA v. William Stuart Indus. (Far East), No. 85 civ. 9911 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 10, 1986) (stating 
that trademark infringement claims are generally arbitrable under the Second Circuit law); Saucy 
Susan Prods., Inc. v. Allied Old English, Inc., 200 F. Supp. 724,728 (S.D.N.Y. 1961): Hilkers Indus. v. 
William Stuart Indus., 640 F. Supp. 175, 177 (S.D.N.Y. 1986). Lindsay, supra note 97, at 685 & 703; 
Plant, supra note 95, at 12; and Martin, supra note 106, at 941 & 970. 
H 9 Wyatt Earp Enterprises v. Sackman, Inc., 157 F.Supp. 621 (S.D. N.Y. 1958). 
120 Saucy Susan Products, Inc. v. Allied Old English, Inc., 200 F.Supp. 621 (S.D.N.Y. 1958). 
121 Homewood Industries, Inc. v. Caldwell, 360 F.Supp. 1201 (N.D. !II. 1973). 
122 Alexander Binzel Corp. v. Nu-Tecsys Corp., No. 91-C2092, 1992 WL 26932 {N.D. Ill. Feb. 11, 1992). 
123 U.S. Diversified Industries, Inc. v. Barrier Coatings Corporation, Civil No. 83-2124-T (D.Mass. 
October 181h, 1982). !n the same way, see BVD. Licensing Corp. v. Maro Hosiery Corp., 688 F. Supp. 
961 (S.D.N.Y. 1988). 
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arbitration clauses in the IP arena. 124 Or, even better, it means that arbitrability of these 
issues remains somewhat unsettled. 
d. 1i-ade Secrets 
Similar to copyright and trademark matters, neither federal nor state legislation 
provides for arbitration of trade secret misappropriation issues. Prior to the leading cases on 
the arbitrability of antitrust disputes, there was some hesitancy as to the arbitration of 
trade secrets due to competition law conccrns. 125 
For instance, in A. & E. Pbstik Pak Co. v. Monsanto Co., the Ninth Circuit held 
that, due to these concerns, a trade secret dispute could not be arbitrable. 126 So, after the 
U.S. Supreme Court's last rulings on the arbitrability of antitrust cases 127 , in Aerojet~ 
General Corp. v. Machine TOol Works, the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit 
affirmed the district court's order to arbitrate claims related to trade secret 
misappropriation. 128 
In addition, the legal treatment of trade secrets is 1norc local, as it is made by state 
courts, and therefore it is different from that of patent, copyright, and trademark 
infringement, which are bound up in federal law and so implicate certain public policy 
and exclusive jUlisdiction issues. Hence, courts <:1re likely to hold that trade secret claims arc arbitrable. 129 
Ill. 2. Brazilian Approach 
In Brazil, arbitration canl:e traced back to Imperial times. 130 Until1866, the Q)mrnercial Ox:le 
of1850 provided formandatmyarbitration for certain issues. Arbitration was uniformly regulated in the 
countlywith the enacm1ent of the Civil Procedure Code of1939, which was replaced by the Civil 
ProccdureCodeofl973 (CPC). 131 
TI,eL.eideArbitrogcm,or Brazilianl.awonArbin-ationNo. 9.307 ofl996 (Arbitration Law) m, 
derogates the CPCof 1973 133 provisions that relate to arbitration. The Arbia·ation Law in Brazil was 
inspired by many intemational arbiLTation in .. '>truments, such as the UNCITRAL Model Law134, the 
124 Plant, supra note 95, at 13. See also Plant, supra note 70, at 299-300, where he suggests a model of 
IP arbitration clause, which could be more likely to assure the enforcement of an arbitral award on the 
above-discussed controversial areas of IP. 
125 Martin, supra note 106, at 942. 
l 26 A. & E. Plastik Pak Co. v. Monsanto Co., 396 F.2d 710 (91h Cir 1968). 
127 See, e.g., Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, 473 U.S. 614 (1985). 
128 Aerojet-General Corp. v. Machine Tool Works, 895 F.2d 736, 738 (Fed. Cir. 1990). 
129 Martin, supra note 106, at 943. 
130 Brazil was a Portuguese colony till September, J1h 1822, when Brazil got independent. With its Independence, 
Brazil became a Kingdom. governed by the successors of the Portuguese monarchy. Only on November 15!11, 
1889 Brazil became a Federal Republic. 
Bl NADIA DE ARAUJo, DIREITO INTERNAC10NAL PRNAOO, TEORIA E PRATICA 8PAS!LEIPA 415416 (Editora Renovar 2003). 
m Lei No. 9.307, de 23 de setembro de 1996, D.O.U. de 24.09.1996. 
133 C.P.C., or Lei No. 5.869, de 11 de janeiro de 1973, D.O.U. de 17.11.1973. 
134 UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration, U.N. Doc. A/40/17, Annex I (as adopted 
on June 21, 1985), available at http://www.uncitral.org/english/texts/arbitration/ml-arb.htm 
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oldSpanishArbitTationActof 1988 135 , the New York Convcntion136, and the Intcr~American 
Convention on International Commercial Arbitration (Panama Convention) 137 • 
Indeed, only after the enactment of the Arbitration Law of 1996 did arbitration 
receive enhanced credibility in Brazil. Before, arbitration agreements were not capable of 
specific performance, so that the party refusing to arbitrate could simply pay damages for 
breach of the arbitration clause instead of being actually bound by the arbitration clause. 
Furthermore, for the recognition of foreign arbitral awards by the Sufm~mo Tribunal FederaL, 
or Brazilian Federal Supreme Court (STF), the so-called 11 J)rocesso de homologaqiio de 
sentenqa arbilral estrangeira", or recognition of foreign judgments procedure 138 , required 
both the homologayao or recognition in the country where the arbitral award was made 
and in Brazil in order to enforce it in BraziL 
Thus, at the international level, Brazil did not have a good reputation concerning 
international arbitration. 1bday, before foreign arbitral awards arc referred to a state court 
for execution, the STF's recognition procedure still covers issues reb ted to the compliance 
with service requirements and public policy interests. 139 
In contrast to its U.S. counterpart, the Brazilian law on objective arbitrability is 
based upon express provisions oflaw. According to Article 1 of the Brazilian Arbitration 
Law, property rights that involve rights at free disposal of the parties may be subject to 
arbitration (direitos J)(!tTirnoniais disponiveis). !·JOIn so doing, contractually accessible rights 
differ from statutory rights in the sense that the latter are political commands, enacted in 
the name of the common good, which are for or against certain types of conduct or groups 
in society. In this case, non-arbitrabLlity would arise where private autonomy ceases and 
collective interests take hold. 141 
135 Ley de Arbitraje (Dec. 5, 1988, 36/1988). Last December this Act was replaced by the new Spanish 
Arbitration Act of 2003, Ley de Arbitraje (Dec. 23, 2003, 60/2003) (entered into force on March 261"·, 2004). 
lJ6 See supra note 57. 
m See supra note 56. 
138 The Brazilian process of recognition of foreign judgments applies to the recognition of foreign arbitral 
awards, and it is regulated by articles 483 and 484 C.P.C., article 15 of the "Lei de lntroduc;ao ao C6digo Civif' 
(L!CC) or Civil Code Introductory Law (Decreta-Lei No. 4.657, de 4 de setembro de 1942, D.O.U. 18.09.1942), 
and articles 215-224 of the "Regimento lnterno do Supremo Tribunal Federal', or Internal Rules of tr,e STF, 
dated as of October, 151h 1980, available at http://www.stf.gov.br/institucional/regimento/ 
13s Brazil has a centralized process of recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments, which 
includes foreign arbitral awards. In so doing, every single judgment or award decided abroad has 
to go through the homologac;ao process by the STF. 
140 See supra note 133, Brazilian Arbitraiion Law, articie 1: "As pessoas capazes de contratar 
poderao va/er-se da arbitragem para dirimlr litigios relativos a direitos patrimoniais disponiveis." 
For further comments on that, see JOEL DIAS FIGUEIRA JR., ARBITRAGEM, JURISDI!;:AO E ExECU!;:Ao 177 ~178 
(Editora Revista dos Tribunais 2nd ed. 1999); BEAT WALTER RECHSTEINER, ARBITRAGEM PRIVADA INTERNACIONAL 
NO BRASIL 56 (Editora Revista dos Tribunals 2"d ed. 2001). 
141 As for the Mercosul countries, Brazii is the only one that links the idea of arbitrabllity to that of 
freely disposable rights. Argentina, Uruguay and Paraguay ail link it to the notion of transaci6n 
or settlement. For Argentina, articles 737 and 738 of the C6o. PROC. C1v. v CoM, bk. VI, tit. 1.; for 
Uruguay, article 472, § Unico of the COo. GENERAL PRoc., tit. VIII, ch. I, for Paraguay, article 774, 
caput of the COo. PRoc. C1v, PRoc. ARB., tit. I, ch. 1. For further comments on these provisions, see 
Alex Kalinski Bayer, Arbitragem e Jurisdif:;fio, 19 REVISTA DE DIREITO 8ANCARIO, FlNANCEIRO, DO MERCADO 
DE CAPITAlS E DA ARBITRAGEM 296, 297 (Jan./Mar. 2003); LEE, Supra note i43, pp. 60-61. 
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In order to exemplify what freely disposable rights arc, it is crucial first to give an 
overview of the Brazilian objective arbitrability. As can be inferred from the above~ 
mentioned Article l, not all property rights relate to personal rights over which individuals 
have basic authority and discretion. 142 Freely disposable rights are therefore those that can 
be transferable, assigned, relinquished and negotiated. 143 
According to Article 92, II of the CPC and Article 3, § 12 of the Lei dos ]uizados 
Especia.is Civeis e Criminais, or Law on the Courts of Small Claims No. 9.099 of 1995, freely 
disposable rights do not include rights that are held so by legal provisions, such as rights 
concerning the status and capacity of people, or those that are related to maintenance 
and support of children, insolvency and tax law, bbor accidents, and waste disposal. 144 
Furthermore, freely disposable rights do not cover rights that are the basis for causes of 
action that require the intervention of the Ministerio P1iblico or Pubtic Prosecutor. HS 
Moreover, individuals have no basic authority or discretion over antitrust146, family147 , and 
wills and states issucs. 143 Therefore, these issues are norHwbitrable in Brazil. Still, there are 
controversies as to consumer arbitration, specifically when a one~sided arbitration clause 
is at stake. 149 
On the other hand, coq)orate law issues may be subject to arbitration. For instance, 
under Article 129, § 29 of the Leidas S/A, or Law on the Business Corporations No. 6.404 
of 1976 150 , arbitration agreements may be included in bylaws of Brazilian corporations. 
142 JoAo BOSCO LEE, ARBITRI'IGEM COMERCIAL INTERNAC!ONAL NOS PAiSES DO MERCOSUL 62 (Editors Juru8. 2003). 
143 Antonio Jose de Mattos Neto, DiJ·eifos PalrimoniaisDisponfveis e lndisponfveis a luz da Lei da Arbitragem, 
361 REVISTA fORENSE 293, 296 (May/Jun. 2002). 
144 See C.P.C. article 92: "Compete, porem, exclusivamente ao juiz de direito processar e jufgar: I. o 
processo de insotvencia; fl. as ag6es concementes ao estado e a capac/dade da pessoa." See also Lei 
No. 9.099, article 3, § 2: "Ficam exclufdas da competencia do Juizado Especial as causas de natureza 
alimental; falimentar, fiscal e de interesse da Fazenda PUblica, e tamMm as relativas a acidentes de 
traba/ho, a resfduos e ao estado e capac/dade das pessoas, ainda que de cunho patn·monial." (Lei No. 
9.099, de 26 de setembro de 1995, D.O.U. de 27.09.1995). 
145 Jose Maria Rossani Garcez, Arbitrabi!idade no Direito Brasileiro e lnternacional, 12 REVISTA DE DIREITO 
BANCARIO, fiNANCEiRO E DO MERCADO OE CAPITAlS 337, 339 (Apr./ Jun. 2001 ). 
Ms Joao Bosco Lee, 0 Conceito de Arbitrabilidade nos Pafses do Mercosul, 8 REviSTA DE DIREITO BANCARIO, 
fiNANCEIRO E DO MERCADO DE CAPITAlS 346, 354-357 (Apr./Jun. 2000). See also Mattos Neto, supra note 144, 
p. 302. 
147 Marcos Paulo de Almeida Salles, Da Arbitrabilidade, 10 REVISTA OE DIREITO BANCARIO, FINANCEIRO E DO 
MERCADo DE CAPiTAlS 360, 363 (Oct./Dec. 2000). See also Mattos Neto, supra note 144, p. 300. 
148 Mattos Neto, supra note 144, p. 300. 
1
"
9 Selma Lemes argues consumer disputes are arbitrab!e, even if one-sided contracts are considered, on 
the grounds of article 4, §2" of the Arbitration Law or Lei de Arbitragem No. 9.307/96. Selma M. Ferreira 
Lemes, Arbitragem e Direito de Consumo, 0 REViSTA BRAS!LEIRA DE ARBITRAGEM 188 (Jul./Oct. 2003) But, 
Professor Claudia Lima Marques (a Brazilian consumer law expert) does not agree on that, considering 
impractical the use of arbitration where weaker parties are involved, on the grounds of article 51, VII of the 
C6digo de Defesa do Consumidor or Consumers Law No. 8.078/90. Arguing against consumer arbitration 
see Mattos Neto, supra note 144, p. 30. 
150 Lei das S/A No. 6.404, de 15 de dezembro de 1976, D.O.U. de 17.12.1977 (suplemento). 
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Moreover, either in case a Labor Union is involved in a labor dispute or in case arbitration 
is foreseen under a statutory provision, arbitration involving labor law may take place. 151 
Stitt, there is much uncertainty regarding arbitrabi!ity of disputes in Brazil 152 , and 
that applies to IP matters as well. 
In Brazil IP disputes are considered potentially arbitrable, since property rights are 
considered generally arbitrable. But the controversial question is where to draw a line 
between freely and non~disposable rights. In this sense, one has to look for limits arising out 
of public policy concerns. 
For instance, Article 75, § 3 of the Lei de Propriedade Industrial, or Law on Industrial 
Property No. 9.279 of J 996 (UP) 153 requires special governmental authorization for the 
grant of patents that relate to the national security. Definitively, matters related to this 
kind of situation are not arbitrable. After all, the Brazilian public policy would be at issue. 
A similar rationale would apply for the arbitrability over the validity matters. Article 
57 of the LIP mandates that causes of actions concerning the nullity of patents, industrial 
design, and trademarks must fall within the exclusive jurisdiction of Brazilian federal 
courts, where the INPI--in case it is not the claimant- is to intervene obligatorily. 154 Of 
course, this does not mean that an arbitrator could not even consider the validity of an IP 
right in rendering an award, but rather, that he/she cannot declare the nullity of an IP 
right and intend it to be effective erg a omnes. 
Under Article 18 LIP, major concerns, such as morals, security, public health, and 
public policy are noted, so that the IP disputes involving these issues would not be 
arbitrable. 155 Furthermore, issues related to compulsory licenses and to IP crimes are not 
arbitrable as welL 156 
151 Garcez, supra note 146, p. 346 (citing the article 114, §§ 1 and 2 of the C.F.) In other circumstance, even 
without the participation of a Labor Union, arbitration is foreseen under article 7 of the Law on Strikes No. 7.783 
(Lei No. 7.783, de 28 de junho de 1989, D.O.U. de 29.06.1989); article 23, § 1 of the Law on Ports No. 8.630 
(Lei No. 8.630, de 25 de fevereiro de 1993, D.O.U. de 26.02.1993); and article 4, II of the Law the Share of 
Pmfits by Employees No. 10.101 (Lei No. 10.101, de 19 de dezembro de 2000, D.O.U. de 20.12.2000). Also, 
GEORGENOR DE SOUZA FRANCO FILHO, A NOVA LEI DA ARBITRAGEM Eo DIREITO DO TRABALHO 20 (Editora LTr 1997). 
152 LEE, supra note 143, p. 60. 
m See article 75: "0 pedido de patente originfirio do Brasil cujo objeto interesse a defesa nacional sera 
processado em carater sigiloso e nao estar8 sujeito as publica({6es previstas nesta lei. § 1. 0 INPI encaminhar8 
o pedido, de imediato, ao 6rg8o competente do Poder Executivo para, no prazo de 60 (sessenta) dias, 
manifestar-se sabre o carater sigi/oso. Oecorrido o prazo sem a manifesta({8o do 6rg8o competente, o pedido 
sera processado nonna!mente. § 2. E vedado o depOsito no exterior de pedido de patente cujo objeto tenha 
sido considerado de interesse da defesa nacionat, bem como quafquer divulgaqtio do mesmo, salvo expressa 
autoriza({tiO do 6rgtio competente. § 3. A explora({Eio e a cesstio do pedido au da patente de interesse da 
defesa nacionat estao condicionadas a previa autorizaqao do 6rgao competente, assegurada indenizaqao 
sempre que houver restriqao dos direitos do depositante ou do titular. (Lei No. 9.279, de 14 de maio de 1996, 
D.O.U. de 15.05.1996). 
104 See supra note 154, article 57: '1'1. a({Eio de nulidade de patente sera ajuizada no foro da Justiqa Federal e 
o !NPI, quando nao for autor; intervira no feito. § 1 _ 0 prazo para resposta do reu titular da patente sera de 60 
(sessenta) dias. § 2. Transitada em julgado a decisf!io da aqao de nulidade, o INPI publicara anota({80, para 
ciencia de terceiros_" 
155 See LIP article 18, 1: "Ntio sao patenteaveis: I* o que for contrfirio a moral, aos bans costumes e a 
seguranqa, a ordem e a saUde pUbficas." See also Luiz Guiiherme de A. Vieira Loureiro, Arbitragem e 
Propriedade Industria/, 5 RE:viSTA DE DIREITO PRIVADO 149, 156 (Jan./Mar. 2001). 
1SG /d., pp. 156-157. See also LIP articles 68-74, regarding mandatory licensing; and articles 183*195, covering 
IP crimes, including the ones related to antitrust issues. 
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Finally, it is important to stress that the InsUtuto Nacional de ProfJriedade Intelectual, 
or National Institute for Intellectual Property (INPI), recognized the possibility of including 
arbitration clauses in licensing and know,how contracts. 157 '1l1us, it appears that IP disputes 
that are arbitrable include those capable of settlement such as patent licenses, trademark 
assigrnncnts, publishing contracts and franchising agreements. Nonetheless, given the 
previous considerations, questions that raise public policy issues probably render disptncs 
arising thereof non,arbitrable. 
Either way, in Brazil "experimentation" witl have to be the word of the day, as for 
now there have not been many judicial decisions on this topic. 158 
IV Conclusion 
An English judge in 1984 envisioned public policy as: "a very unruly horse, and 
when once you get: astride it you never know where it: will carry you. It may lead you from 
sound law. It is never argued at all, except when other points fail." 159 Hence, the truth is 
that: both uncertainty and inconsistencies concerning the interpretation and application 
of public policy by State courts encourage the losing party in arbitn_ition to rely on public 
policy to resist, or at least delay, enforcement. Perhaps to keep that 11 unruly horse" over 
control there could be a harmonization of the notion of public policy around the vvorld. 160 
But it is true that much has to be done in order to get to this distant and perhaps 
even idyllic goal. The modern world's growing exploitation ofiP collides with the principle 
of territoriality of IP rights. '' 161 And, in order to tackle with this endeavor, state courts, 
arbitral tribunals, legislative and executive bodies, and legal scholars need to join efforts. 
As for arbitration, it: would be quite unsound if it were indifferent to the general 
interests identified by the law, even if arbitrators are reluctant to see the ship founder 162 , 
in case they had to declare the non,arbitrability of a dispute. The present author agrees 
with Marc Blessing that the arbitrators arc neither the guardians of the interests of States, 
nor the obedient servants of the parties. i63 Hence, there must be a balance, where arbitrators 
keep an eye on the limits of arbitrable matters, in order to promote the so-called efficiency 
of the arbitration system. 
157 Selma Maria Ferreira Lemes, Arbitragem em Propdedade tnte/ectuaf..-./nstituir:;Oes Arbitrais, 74 REVISTA oE 
DIREITO CiVIL, IM081UARIO, AGR.ARIO E EMPRESARIAL 120, 126-127 (Oct./Dec. 1995). See also Ato Norrnativo No. 120 
(Dec. 17, 1993). 
158 For an example of enforcement of an arbitration agreement in a know-how contract, see T JRJ, Apela9-fio 
Civel No. 2001.001.28808, Relator: Desembargador Gilberte Rego, 30.04.2002 (Evadin Ind. AmazOnia Ltda. 
v. Mitsubishi Electric Corporation (MELCO). 
159 Richardson v. Mellish, (1824) 2 Bing. 228; [1824-34] AllER Rep. 258. 
wo Sheppard, supra note 40, pp. 247-248. 
161 Patrick Nutzi, Article, Intellectual Property ArMration. E.J.P.R. 1997, 19(4), 192-197 (1997), WL EIPR 1997, 
19(4), 192. 
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235, 244 12001 I 
'
63 Blessing, supra note 28, p. 40. 
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It is also true that the expansion of arbitrability, which can be noticed in the U.S. 
and probably soon will be noticed in Brazil, imposes certain standards on the conduct of 
arbitrations. In this regard, Professor Robert von Mehren adds that arbitrators should be 
both competent and neutraL 164 
In conclusion, there is a great deal of policy and ideas that need to be developed 
concerning arbitration in Brazil. The U.S. has been considering arbitration longer than 
BraziL First of all, the debate on arbitrability of IP disputes in the U.S began decades ago. 
Second, the expansion of arbitrability was dealt from the very enactment of the FAA in 
1925 as a matter of public policy, in order to further the American economic development 
at the domestic and international level. Third, American law places a greater emphasis on 
the contractual nature of arbitration, which would better allow parties to adapt this dispute 
resolution method to their commercial needs. 165 Finally, the arbitration is much more 
institutionalized in the U.S., which enhances the social trust on arbitration. On the other 
hand, in Brazil, an intense debate on arbitrability began only with the enactment of the 
Arbitration Law in 1996. Only until recently the constitutionality of this statute was 
afflrmed; in December 2002 the STF decided on the constitutionality of binding arbitration 
agreements. 166 
Nonetheless, the arbitrability ofJP disputes in Brazil is pretty similar to that of other 
countries, as Germany and France. So, the fact is that Brazil is not so conservative; 
however this assertion depends on your point of reference. Of course, in the U.S. the 
arbitrability of IP disputes is far more liberal than in Brazil, and this is not surprising 
considering the historical developments of each of these countries. 
Thus, the duty now is to make arbitration as fair, accountable, and cost~effective 
as possible. The hope is that the Brazilian society, as a whole, could envision the myrlad of 
benefits that arbitration can bring. Time will tell. 
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165 Professor Rau compares the contractual nature of the Arnerican model of arbitration to !he European trend 
which ~is to consider the essence of arbitration as the exercise of quasHudicial power, and thus for arbitral 
procedure to follow that of State Courts." See Alan Scott Rau & Catherine PE:damon, La Contractua/isation de 
L'arbitrage: /e Modele Americain, 3 R-FVUE DE L'ARBITRAGE 451, 451-452 (2001 ). 
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